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Este artículo presenta el primer modelo donde la disuasión de entrada se
obtiene a través de vías financieras y no a través del mercado de los productos.
En los modelos estandard de interacción entre los mercados financieros y reales,
la utilización de los instrumentos financieros por parte de una empresa disuade
la entrada afectando el comportamiento en el mercado de los productos, mien-
tras que en nuestro modelo la disuasión de entrada se obtiene afectando el
comportamiento, en el mercado de capitales, de los inversores hacia las empre-
sas entrantes. Encontramos que para disuadir la entrada, los títulos poseidos
en la empresa ya presente en el mercato, deben de ser suficientemente arries-
gados (acciones, por ejemplo) al contrario del resultado estandard de Brander
y Lewis (1986) que la deuda disuade la entrada. El modelo contribuye al de-
bate sobre el problema de si los bancos deben estar autorizados o no a poseer
acciones de empresas. Además, proporciona una explicación de la razón por
la cual los venture capitalists poseen títulos automáticamente convertibles en
las empresas jovenes.
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“ The diﬃculties inherent in acquiring external finance in the United States
in the nineteenth century provide an explanation for the basis of the fortunes
of certain American entrepreneurs and suggest at least one reason why the
economy was characterized by increasing concentration in the growth sectors”
Lance Davis (1966).
1 Introduction
This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through
financial rather than product-market channels. This is a new form of entry
deterrence which has not previously been considered, but which is nonetheless
potentially important in countries and industries where funding opportunities
are relatively scarce. In standard models of the interaction between product
and financial markets, the focus has always been on how a firm’s use of financial
instruments aﬀects its own product market behavior, and thus its rival’s optimal
response. By contrast, in this paper we show that even if financial contracts are
completely neutral in their impact on product market behavior, they have an
impact on the behavior of investors, and thus aﬀect the funding opportunities
of potential entrants in this way.
One might think that with imperfectly competitive financial markets, the
problem of financial entry deterrence would be trivial: investors (who share in
the surplus generated by investment) should deny funding to entrants to limit
industrial competition. In fact, matters are not so simple, as the following
simple example demonstrates. Suppose a monopoly investor signs a contract
in which he agrees to supply the monopoly amount of capital to a single firm,
in return for safe debt in that firm. (Holding safe debt is of course desirable
since it maximizes the entrepreneur’s incentives to exert eﬀort). A problem
arises because the investor is well-informed about the industry and his return
in the funded firm is safe and unaﬀected by changes in profitability - so the
investor will be tempted to fund another firm to enter the industry. Of course,
knowing that the investor will be tempted to supply a second firm ex-post,
the first firm will not accept the same terms ex-ante, so the investor’s profits
are reduced by his lack of commitment. This commitment problem is known
as the “Coase problem” in direct analogy to the problem of durable goods
monopoly (see Rey and Tirole, forthcoming).
The logic of our result is very straightforward. The form of the financial
contract between the incumbent firm and its investor will aﬀect the investor’s
willingness to provide funds to entrant firms, by making his returns more or
less sensitive to the eﬀect of product market competition. The solution to
the Coase problem is to make the investor’s claim suﬃciently sensitive to the
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profits of the incumbent firm that he has a financial incentive not to fund the
second firm. In eﬀect, recognizing the possibility that a knowledgeable investor
could fund several firms in an industry changes financial contract design from
a one-sided to a two-sided moral hazard problem, where the entrepreneur’s
incentives must be traded oﬀ against those of the investor.
We show that the entry-deterring claim is in fact equity (or, equivalently,
risky debt), in contrast to the Brander-Lewis result that debt induces tougher
behavior in the product market, and so deters entry. The diﬀerence in re-
sults comes from the diﬀerent channels through which entry deterrence occurs.
Brander and Lewis (1986) - and the literature on the interaction between prod-
uct and financial markets which has followed them1 - abstract from any finan-
cial market eﬀects of the design of claims, and concentrate on product market
eﬀects. We do the reverse. Our model is in some ways a new formulation of
the “deep pocket” argument. An incumbent can shorten an entrant’s pocket
by borrowing money which would otherwise be invested in his rival. Which
approach is the most relevant in practice is largely an empirical question. We
believe that there are some situations where diﬃculty in obtaining funding
per se, rather than fear of aggressive behavior by an incumbent, is the factor
which prevents firms from entering the market. This is certainly the case in
some Eastern European countries, and countries such as in Italy, where com-
petition in financial markets is very limited and has never been encouraged.
Moreover, historical evidence suggests that our model can be readily applied
to the nineteenth century United States.2
The model also sheds light on the debate as to whether banks should be
permitted to hold equity in firms. In situations where there are ample alter-
1The literature on the interaction between product and financial markets is becoming
extensive, here we just mention a few papers. The impact of capital structure on incumbent
product market behavior has been analyzed by Showalter (1995), who extends the Brander-
Lewis model to price competition, Maskimovic (1988) who looks at the impact of debt on
collusive outcomes; and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1998) who show how the extent of
outside finance can aﬀect whether firms compete in strategic substitutes or complements.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Poitevin (1989a) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) are instead
mainly concerned with the design of claims on the entrant; they show how agency problems
in financial markets can leave entrant firms vulnerable to predation. Gertner, Gibbons and
Scharfstein (1988) analyze the conflicts that arise when capital structure is used to signal
to more than one receiver. Poitevin (1989b) and Battacharya-Chiesa (1995) depart from
the norm in considering lenders’ rather than product market incentives. They show that
coordination on a common lender can help coordinate on mutually desirable outcomes for
the industry, but do not consider the design of claims. Empirical evidence of financial market
eﬀects on product markets is provided by Chevalier (1995), Chevalier-Scharfstein (1996) and
Zingales (1998).
2For a theoretical discussion of why financial markets are often uncompetitive, and a
review of anti-trust cases in financial markets, see Bruzzone and Polo (1998). In section 6.1
we present a more detailed discussion of case studies.
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native sources of funding for entrants, equity-holding by banks is likely to do
little damage. But where funding sources are imperfectly competitive, an in-
cumbent firm will generally disadvantage its rivals by selling equity to a bank
with a comparative advantage (e.g. specialized knowledge leading to lower cost
of funds) in funding its industry. Thus one may wonder about the wisdom of
the prescription of a universal banking system for Eastern European countries
(see Frydman et al 1993 for further discussion).
In a second application of the model, we provide an explanation for why
venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start-up firms.
Until now, the reason why conversion occurs automatically has been something
of a puzzle. Existing models motivate convertibility as a means of providing
entrepreneurs with the correct incentives, so conversion is always in the venture
capitalist’s interest ex post, making the compulsion to convert redundant. We
show that convertibility can also be used to motivate venture capitalists (in
particular, not to fund competing firms); conversion is not necessarily in the
venture capitalist’s interest ex post, so compulsion is necessary.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model.
Section 3 examines the second-best financial contract between the incumbent
firm and the investor, and explains why financial entry deterrence will not
generally be possible under such a contract. The entry deterring (third best)
contract is set out in section 4. Section 5 discusses some extensions of the
basic model, and section 6 presents the applications to banking regulation and
venture capital. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Structure
Two entrepreneurs have the opportunity to enter a new and profitable industry;
each of them has to make an investment Ii in order to enter the industry and
produce. The entrepreneurs have no internal funds: thus, they must borrow
Ii from an external investor.3
For ease of exposition, we assume that only one investor can finance this
industry. This assumption is not essential to our results, which would hold
provided there is some form of imperfect competition between investors.4 How-
3For evidence that entrepreneurs are indeed constrained in setting up and running firms
by their ability to borrow, see Holz-Eakin et al (1994) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989).
4The simplification from imperfect competition to monopoly is standard in the foreclosure
literature (see Rey and Tirole, forthcoming). The incentive to exclude clearly depends on
the idea that there is imperfect competition between investors, since otherwise an entrant
denied funding will simply accept an identical oﬀer from another investor. For evidence that
some financial markets are indeed uncompetitive, we refer the reader to the later discussion
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ever, it greatly simplifies the analysis and the drawing of parallels to the Coase
problem in input supply markets. No important insights are lost in simplifying
from imperfect competition to monopoly in the market for funds, apart from
the impact of the level of financial competition on the design of claims. We
address this briefly in section 5.3.
We assume that the single investor has cost of funds r=1 and makes take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the firm(s).5
Project:
Once started, each firm’s project is subject to moral hazard. After the
project is financed, entrepreneur i chooses a level of eﬀort ei ∈ [∆, 1], which
is not observed by the investor. We assume ∆ ≤ 1/2. Entrepreneurial eﬀort
raises the probability of success, which also depends on whether the firm enjoys
a monopoly position or it competes with the other firm.
Under monopoly, if eﬀort ei is exerted then the project yields RH (success)
with probability ei and RL (failure) with probability (1−ei), where RH > I >
RL > 0.6
Competition reduces the probability of success by ∆.7 That is, under
duopoly, eﬀort ei induces a probability of success of just (ei − ∆) for firm
i. Moreover, firm j’s eﬀort does not aﬀect i’s probability of success and vice
versa.8 This is the simplest possible way of capturing the idea that competition
in section 6.
5The results would be even stronger if we instead allowed firms to make take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers to the investor. But given the investor’s monopoly position, it seems reasonable to
give him the bargaining power.
6In a sample of 49 venture capitalists, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) report that most
venture-backed companies that have failed to meet expectations still manage to ”squeeze
out a stable, independent existence”, which supports our assumption that RL > 0. The
interest of the assumption RL > 0 is that it becomes possible to distinguish between debt
and equity, which are equivalent if there are no returns to divide in the failure state.
7In Gorman and Sahlman (1989), 34% of the venture capitalist respondents cited com-
petition as a factor contributing to financed companies’ failure. For more general evidence
that competition reduces the probability of survival, see Hannan and Freeman (1989), or
Carroll and Hannan (1989). See also the next footnote. Similar results can be obtained
when competition reduces revenues in case of success; but the analysis is considerably more
cumbersome, so we use this simpler set-up.
8See Cestone andWhite (2000) for some stylized examples as to when such an assumption
might be taken literally. Here we make it mainly for modelling purposes. It has several
advantages, including allowing us to be agnostic on whether competition increases or reduces
optimal eﬀort by managers (on which the literature is inconclusive - see Hart (1983), Martin
(1993)). A probably more realistic alternative would be to assume that firm i’s probability
of success is reduced by firm j’s eﬀort (although this is not obvious since some eﬀorts,
such as advertising, may be mutually beneficial). In this case, a diﬀerent type of entry
deterrence becomes possible. If Firm 1 commits to a high eﬀort, Firm 2’s entry becomes
more and more unprofitable per se. This is the standard form of entry deterrence, just like
accumulation of capital à la Spence (1977) and Dixit (1979, 1980). Rather than repeating
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shifts probability mass from high revenue to low revenue outcomes.
Preferences:
All agents are risk-neutral. Firms 1 and 2 are identical. Entrepreneur i’s
von Neumann-Morgernstern utility function is
U(Rbi, ei) = Rbi −Ψ(ei)
where Rbi is the expected monetary payment borrowing firm i receives af-
ter revenues are realized. Eﬀort ei costs Ψ(ei) to the entrepreneur. Thus,
were he to receive a flat payment, he would exert the lowest possible eﬀort.
The function Ψ( · ) is strictly increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
convex. Entrepreneurs have reservation wage Wi. The simplest way to think
of this parameter is in terms of the entrepreneur’s outside wage: how much
he could earn if he did not borrow from the investor to start his own firm.
A related idea is that the entrepreneur has some bargaining power in dealing
with the investor, and so is able to extract rents of value Wi. However, one
could also think of Wi as the best oﬀer that the entrepreneur i has received
from competing investors. In this case a higher Wi would correspond to more
competition between investors. A third interpretation for Wi is in terms of
assets provided by the entrepreneur. This third interpretation would result in
the investor solving somewhat diﬀerent optimization programs, but the basic
insights would be similar. For concreteness we will proceed in terms of the
first interpretation because it yields the most straightforward analysis.
For notational simplicity, we will omit the subscript 1 when referring to
Firm 1: therefore Firm 1’s return, eﬀort and reservation wage will be Rb , e
and W throughout.
Timing:
t=1 The investor oﬀers a contract to firm 1. Firm 1 accepts or rejects. If
Firm 1 accepts, then it picks a level of eﬀort e ∈ [∆, 1]. The eﬀort decision is
pure moral hazard, not observed by the investor.
t=2 The investor decides whether to fund Firm 2 or not; if it decides to
do so, it oﬀers a contract to Firm 2, which then accepts or rejects. Firm 2
observes whether firm 1 has been funded when considering the investor’s oﬀer.
If Firm 2 accepts the contract, then it picks an eﬀort level e2 ∈ [∆, 1].
t=3 Payoﬀs are realized according to the manager’s level of eﬀort and to
whether the investor has funded one or both firms
The timing of the model is summarized in the following figure:
standard arguments, we work with the simpler case where eﬀorts are neither complements
nor substitutes in order to focus attention on the new form of entry deterrence.
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Contracts:
Financial contracts simply state a rule for splitting the cash-flow. More
precisely, a contract is a pair of real numbers
n
RLb , R
H
b
o
specifying the en-
trepreneur’s payoﬀ in case of failure and success. Any borrower is protected
by limited liability; thereforeRLb ≥ 0 and RHb ≥ 0. We assume that it is impos-
sible to write an exclusive dealing contract, imposing some form of punishment
for the investor contingent on whether he funds the new entrant Firm 2. Very
likely, such a contract would be illegal and thus not enforceable.9 Moreover,
since Firm 1’s success or failure are both consistent with either competition or
monopoly, the parties cannot circumvent this legal constraint by contracting
on revenues.
2.2 Entry Deterrence and the Coase problem
The industry has the same structure as in the foreclosure literature. The
investor plays the role of an upstream monopolist, providing downstream firms
with an essential input to the production process (money); there is potential
competition in the downstream industry, but it can develop only if both firms
have access to funding.
The investor can oﬀer a contract to one or both firms. If only one firm
9An alternative reason why a contract which is directly contingent on firm 2’s existence
is not used lies in the diﬃculty of verifying whether firm 2 is indeed competing with firm 1.
An exclusive dealing clause would then be ineﬃcient in that it might discourage funding of
valuable, non-competing firms. More generally, we believe that because the legal process is
time-consuming and costly, parties may prefer to use financial rather than legal incentives
to prevent competition emerging.
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is funded, it then enjoys a monopoly position; otherwise, the two firms com-
pete in the product market, which makes expected industry-wide profits lower.
Defining VM and VCi as monopoly profit and duopoly profits net of agency
costs,10 the interesting case clearly arises when:
V M > V C1 + V
C
2
that is, when the investor (who captures the surplus from lending) should
optimally let just one firm enter the industry and deny funding to other firms.
From the point of view of the investor, this is clearly a matter of financial entry
deterrence: if he does not oﬀer funding to the second firm, the latter cannot
enter. But in fact, matters are not so simple. Readers familiar with the
foreclosure literature will guess that the investor faces a commitment problem
in not funding Firm 2. After having funded Firm 1, the investor may have an
incentive to behave opportunistically and also let Firm 2 enter the industry.
To be more specific, assume Firm 1 is naive and signs the financial contract
expecting to enjoy a monopoly position; it may then be ex-post optimal for
the investor to expropriate firm 1 by funding Firm 2 as well. In equilibrium
Firm 1 will anticipate this opportunistic behavior, so the investor would like
to commit not to fund firm 2. This commitment problem is what - by analogy
to the new foreclosure doctrine - we call the investor’s Coase problem.11 Thus
in what follows we will refer to successful financial entry deterrence as having
solved the investor’s Coase problem.12
Two features of our model are crucial for the Coase problem to arise: first,
when Firm 1 signs the financial contract with the investor, it does not observe
whether Firm 2 is being funded or not (note that contracting need not be
sequential; the Coase problem would also arise with simultaneous and secret
contracts). Second, the contract with Firm 1 cannot be made contingent on
whether Firm 2 is funded.
10A formal definition for VM and VCi will be given later.
11The Coase problem is so-named because of the further analogy with Ronald Coase’s
(1972) discussion of the commitment problem faced by a durable good monopolist.
12Notice that although economists are accustomed to thinking in terms of credit-rationing,
from the industry point of view what the investor faces here is a problem of over-funding.
As in the foreclosure literature, the investor always has incentives to supply more than the
ex-ante optimal amount of credit to the downstream firms.
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3 The optimal contract without potential en-
trants
3.1 The commitment case
Before dealing with the investor’s Coase problem, we solve the benchmark
(monopoly) case where Firm 1 faces no threat of entry by potential competi-
tors. This is equivalent to assuming that the investor can credibly commit
not to fund any other firm in the industry. In this case the optimal financial
contract for the investor solves:
MaxRH
b
,RL
b
,e
h
e(RH −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb )− I1)
i
(IR) eRHb + (1− e)RLb −Ψ(e) ≥W
(IC) RHb −RLb = Ψ0(e)
(LL) RLb ≥ 0, RHb ≥ 0
We will refer to the solution to this program as the second best optimum,
and denote the associated eﬀort level by eM (M for monopoly).13 RLb and R
H
b
are the borrowing firm’s payoﬀs in case of failure and success. (IR) is the firm’s
participation constraint and (IC) is the firm’s incentive constraint. (LL) is the
limited liability constraint. The solution to this program depends on the level
of W. We state this result in the following:
Lemma 1 In the absence of potential competitors, the investor’s optimal claim
is debt: RLb = 0 and R
H
b = Ψ
0(eM), where eM is the second best eﬀort. Also,
there exists a threshold levelW1 = eMΨ0(eM)−Ψ(eM) for the firm’s reservation
wage such that:
(i) for W≤ W1 optimal eﬀort eM solves RH −RL = Ψ0(e) + eΨ00(e).
(ii) for W1 < W ≤ W¯ optimal eﬀort eM solves eΨ0(e) − Ψ(e) = W and
therefore increases with W.
Eﬀort levels satisfy: eM < e∗ (the first best eﬀort) for any W .
Proof. See Appendix
The interpretation of this result is straightforward: as the security design
literature has pointed out, the optimal financial contract minimizes agency
costs by paying the entrepreneur only in case of success, which boils down to
13If eﬀort was observable then the optimal financial contract would solve:
MaxRL
b
,RH
b
,e
£
e(RH −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb )− I1
¤
e RHb + (1− e)RLb −Ψ(e) ≥W (IR)
RLb ≥ 0, RHb ≥ 0
The first best level of eﬀort e∗ is thus defined by the first order condition:
RH −RL = Ψ0(e∗).
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taking a debt claim in the firm.14 Also, when W is low, inducing the second
best eﬀort eM requires leaving the entrepreneur with an extra rent; therefore,
the first order condition in (i) trades oﬀ the cost of this rent with the benefit
from higher eﬀort. When W is higher than W1 the contract in (i) does not
satisfy the entrepreneur’s IR. Clearly, for this constraint to hold, only the
payment in the high state RHb = Ψ
0(e) is increased, which is equivalent to
increasing eﬀort.
The entrepreneur’s shares of returns in the cases of failure and success
are, respectively, 0 and Ψ0(eM). This can be interpreted as a debt contract
specifying a reimbursement DM = RH − Ψ0(eM). Note that debt is always
risky, as eM < e∗ implies DM = RH − Ψ0(eM) > RL. Not surprisingly, the
investor’s debt claim is relatively risky for low levels of W and becomes safer
as W increases: higher levels of W imply more high-powered entrepreneur’s
incentives, which correspond to a safer claim for the investor.
3.2 Why lack of commitment yields a Coase Problem
When the investor cannot commit to deny funding to subsequent new-entrant
firms, it can be shown that the first entrepreneur does not accept the terms
of the second-best contract derived in lemma 1 above, unless his reservation
wage is very low.
Suppose the above debt contract is signed at stage 1. At stage 2 a second
entrepreneur wants to copy Firm 1’s entrepreneurial idea and produce a com-
peting product. However, Firm 2 has no funds: to enter the market it must
obtain financing from the only investor who is suﬃciently informed about the
industry - that is, Firm 1’s financier.
The second entrepreneur is as good as the first one in implementing projects.
However, he is not an innovator (i.e., has no talent at discovering new projects),
which suggests his reservation wage is lower than the first entrepreneur’s one.
For simplicity, we will assume throughout that W2 = 0.15
The gross return from funding Firm 2 is:
V2 =Maxe2,RLb2,RHb2 (e2 −∆)(RH −RHb2) + (1− e2 +∆)(RL −RLb2)− I2
s.t. : (e2 −∆)RHb2 + (1− e2 +∆)RLb2 −Ψ(e2) ≥ 0
14For a detailed derivation of this result, see Innes (1990).
15This assumption is inessential, but one needs to make some assumption about the cor-
relation between the two entrepreneurs’ reservation wages and this is the simplest. We can
interpret W2 = 0 in terms of the two alternative motivations for reservation wages given in
section 2.1 above. For instance, competition to fund the second firm may be less intense
than competition to fund the first firm, e.g. because the investor learns something about the
second firm from funding the first firm, so outside banks are worried about winners’ curse
problems in competing to fund Firm 2.
11
RHb2 −RLb2 = Ψ0(e2)
RLb2 ≥ 0, RHb2 ≥ 0
Now, will the investor want to strike a deal with Firm 2 ? In other words,
will an investor’s ”Coase problem” arise, whereby the investor (ex-post) op-
timally floods the industry with financial funds? The answer is “yes” if the
following condition holds:
eM(RH −Ψ0(eM)) + (1− eM)RL <
(eM −∆)(RH −Ψ0(eM)) + (1− eM +∆)RL +V2
The left-hand side of this inequality is the value of the investor’s claim in
Firm 1 when the contract
n
RLb = 0, R
H
b = Ψ
0(eM)
o
is in force and Firm 2 is
not funded. The right-hand side is the value of the investor’s claim in F1 when
the same contract holds and Firm 2 is funded, plus the return from funding
Firm 2.
This can be rearranged as condition (1):
∆(RH −RL −Ψ0(eM)) < V2 (1)
When deciding whether to fund Firm 2, the investor trades oﬀ the addi-
tional payoﬀ V2 with the reduced value of his claim in Firm 1 induced by
market competition. As competition reduces the probability of success of both
firms, the investor’s claim is aﬀected by Firm 2’s entry only if it is risky, that
is, if RH −Ψ0(eM) > RL. Also, the riskier the investor’s claim, the less will he
be tempted to fund Firm 2.
The above reasoning underlines the first important result of our paper: an
investor holding suﬃciently safe debt in a firm will always find it optimal to
fund the firm’s rivals.
Knowing that the investor will be tempted to supply a second firm ex-post,
the first entrepreneur will accept the contract
n
RLb = 0, R
H
b = Ψ
0(eM)
o
if and
only if: W ≤ W0 = (eM−∆)Ψ0(eM)−Ψ(eM), that is, whenever his reservation
wage is very low. When W is larger than W0 the entrepreneur will not accept
this contract and the investor will bear ex-ante all the cost of his future lack
of commitment, obtaining just the duopoly profits (net of agency rents) from
the industry. It is in this case that the investor will look for a contractual
solution to eliminate the temptation of opportunism. As we are interested in
analyzing this contractual response to the Coase problem, in what follows we
will assume W > W0.
4 Excluding Firm 2
We have seen that an investor’s Coase problem arises whenever his claim sat-
isfies condition (1). If he wants to preserve the innovating firm’s monopolistic
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rent, the investor must take into account his future opportunistic behavior
when solving for the optimal contract. This boils down to making the in-
vestor’s claim more sensitive to the eﬀect of competition on firm 1’s profit.
More formally, the optimal contract oﬀered to F1 is the solution to the
following program:
MaxRH
b
,RL
b
,e
h
e(RH −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb )− I1
i
(IR)eRHb + (1− e)RLb −Ψ(e) ≥W
(IC)RHb −RLb = Ψ0(e)
(ICI) e(R
H −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb ) ≥
(e−∆)(RH −RHb ) + (1− e+∆)(RL −RLb ) +V2
(LL) RHb ≥ 0, RLb ≥ 0
This program may be referred to as the third best optimum: when a po-
tential entrant exists, the optimal contract must also satisfy the investor’s
incentive compatibility constraint (ICI). The third best solution is described
in the following:
Lemma 2 Assume that at t=2 firm 2 will ask for funding to compete with
firm 1. Assume also that condition (1) holds. Then the optimal financial
contract induces a level of eﬀort eCP < eM . Also, there exists a threshold level
Wˆ = eCPΨ0(eCP )−Ψ(eCP ) for firm 1’s reservation wage such that:
(i) for W ≤ Wˆ the optimal contract is: RLb = 0, RHb = Ψ0(eCP )
(ii) for W > Wˆ the optimal contract is: RLb = b = W − Wˆ , RHb =
b+Ψ0(eCP )
Proof. If condition (1) holds for e = eM , then any contract specified in
Lemma 1 fails to satisfy (IC)I , and thus cannot be a solution to the above
program. In order to solve his Coase problem the investor must make his claim
riskier, i.e. reduce Ψ0(e) = RHb − RLb . This requires inducing an eﬀort level
eCP lower than eM . Clearly, eﬀort is reduced only until the incentive constraint
holds strictly. Therefore eCP is uniquely determined by:
∆(RH −RL −Ψ0(eCP )) = V2
From the firm’s (IC) constraint it then follows that RHb = R
L
b + Ψ
0(eCP ).
Therefore, we are left with choosing the optimal level of RLb .
If W ≤ Wˆ eﬀort eCP is induced by paying the entrepreneur RLb = 0
and RHb = Ψ
0(eCP ), which satisfy as an inequality the entrepreneur’s (IR)
constraint. This contract is uniquely optimal for the investor, in that raising
RLb would only raise agency costs.
If W > Wˆ then the previous contract fails to satisfy the entrepreneur’s
(IR). Therefore RLb must be increased up to b > 0 to satisfy: e
CPΨ0(eCP )+ b−
Ψ(eCP ) = W . Accordingly, RHb = b+Ψ
0(eCP ).
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We provide the following interpretation for the above result. When the
Coase problem arises, the financial contract must solve a double-sided moral
hazard problem. The investor is faced with the following trade-oﬀ. To induce
high levels of eﬀort he would like to have the entrepreneur bear most of the
risk. But on the other hand, the investor has to bear suﬃcient risk to prevent
himself from funding the second firm. In other words, he must internalize the
uncertainty induced by increased competition, which pushes towards a less
high-powered incentive scheme for the entrepreneur. The Coase problem can
be solved only at the expense of less entrepreneurial eﬀort.
The optimal contract for which we have just solved is simply a profit-
sharing rule. We now ask ourselves how this rule can be implemented through
existing financial instruments. It turns out that the third best contract is
more equity-like than the second best contract defined in the previous section.
The features of the “anti-competitive” financial contract are described in the
following:
Proposition 3 An investor wanting to supply only the monopoly amount of
capital to the industry designs his financial claim in order to solve his “Coase
problem”:
(i) if W ≤ Wˆ then he holds risky debt. The entrepreneur owes him Dr =
RH −Ψ0(eCP ); in the case of failure the entrepreneur defaults and the investor
seizes the firm’s cash RL. This claim is riskier than debt DM .
(ii) ifW > Wˆ then the investor holds a combination of safe debt and equity.
He is entitled to the debt reimbursement Ds = RL − b(RH−RL)Ψ0(eCP ) , and also owns
an equity share s = 1− Ψ0(eCP )
RH−RL in Firm 1.
Proof. (i) From Lemma 2 (i), the investor’s shares of returns are RL and
RH−Ψ0(eCP ). It is straightforward to interpret this as holding debt Dr. From
eCP < eM and Ψ00 > 0 it follows that Dr > DM : reimbursement is larger
and default more likely. (ii) Suppose the investor holds debt Ds and an equity
share s. Then his payoﬀ in case of failure is:
Ds+s
³
RL −Ds
´
≡ RL− b(RH−RL)
Ψ0(eCP ) +
³
1− Ψ0(eCP )
RH−RL
´ ³
RL −RL + b(RH−RL)
Ψ0(eCP )
´
≡ RL − b. Analogously, his payoﬀ in case of success is:
Ds+ s(R
H −Ds) ≡ RL− b(RH−RL)Ψ0(eCP ) +
³
1− Ψ0(eCP )
RH−RL
´ ³
RH −RL + b(RH−RL)
Ψ0(eCP )
´
≡ RH − b−Ψ0(eCP ).
Therefore, the optimal return-splitting rule is being implemented
This result is quite intuitive: an investor holding fairly safe debt in firm
1 will always want to fund Firm 2, as his claim is insensitive to the eﬀects
of competition. Also, the temptation to expropriate Firm 1 by funding Firm
2 will be stronger the higher is W, the entrepreneur’s stake in the project.
To solve this commitment problem the investor will make his claim riskier.
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This may turn out to be simply riskier debt as in case (i), or, when the Coase
problem is very serious, a combination of debt and equity as in case (ii). Note
that risky debt can always be reinterpreted as a combination of safe debt and
equity. Therefore, we can reinterpret Proposition 3 in the following way. For
any level of W, the investor holds a combination of safe debt and an equity
share s = 1 − Ψ0
RH−RL ; (i) if W < Wˆ , then safe debt is equal to R
L; (ii) if
W ≥ Wˆ , then safe debt is RL− b(RH−RL)
Ψ0 . In both cases, the investor holds the
same kind of claim, except that the riskless component is reduced as W grows
larger: for large values of W the safe debt component becomes smaller and
the investor gets most of his return from his equity-holding. This is because
a larger entrepreneurial stake implies a more serious commitment problem for
the investor.
There is a close analogy between our financial contracting result and the
remedies for the upstream monopolist’s Coase problem envisioned by the fore-
closure doctrine. As Rey and Tirole (2000) suggest, the upstream monopolist
may want to integrate downwards with one of the downstream firms, in order
to eliminate the temptation of opportunism and credibly commit itself to re-
duce supplies to downstream firms. Equity-holding plays the role of vertical
integration in our context.
Our result provides an explanation for why equity financing is widely used
even in environments characterized by strong informational asymmetries, such
as the financing of new firms and emerging industries. Agency theory suggests
that an investor concerned by the asymmetry of information associated with
start-ups, should hold low information intensity securities, such as debt (see,
e.g. Myers-Majluf 1984). That such firms are often financed by equity issues
is therefore something of a puzzle. Existing explanations for the use of equity
have pointed to the need to reduce excessive risk-taking by the entrepreneur.
However, we argue that the use of equity in such industries can often be seen
as a response to the Coase problem. Two features of new industries make them
particularly vulnerable to the Coase problem. Firstly, successful entry into an
emerging industry is often easier than entry into a mature industry comprising
firms with established reputations, so the temptation to fund competitors is
greater. Secondly, the riskiness of start-ups means that few investors are willing
to provide capital to such firms, so investors in such industries have a degree
of monopoly power over entrepreneurs. An important class of investors in
start-ups and new industries are venture capitalists. Therefore, in section 7
we extend our model to perform a more specific analysis of the venture capital
industry.
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5 Some Extensions and Generalizations
5.1 Remarks on Welfare Analysis
It would be desirable to perform some welfare analysis on the above model.
However, much depends on the social desirability of introducing competition
to an industry, which has not so far been specified. In general, competition will
improve consumer welfare ex-post through higher output and lower prices, so
that one might suppose that it would be desirable for financial regulators to try
to prevent investors from solving the Coase problem. But if the entrepreneur
has a high reservation wage, he might be deterred from entering the industry
at all if the Coase problem cannot be solved. For example, if:
V M > W > V C1
then the entrepreneur can be persuaded to enter the industry only if he can be
guaranteed a monopoly position. In this case regulation making the solution
of the Coase problem more diﬃcult would prevent the emergence of this new
industry. Thus one might suppose that the social optimum would be achieved
by a policy of allowing investors to hold equity in situations where it is impor-
tant to allow monopoly rents, e.g. as a reward to innovation, but to prevent
them from doing so otherwise. This is simply another guise of the familiar
Schumpeterian trade-oﬀ. Using this scheme and the results of our model, it
may be interesting to speculate about the regulation governing investments
by banks in diﬀerent countries. We pursue this issue more fully and provide
more evidence in section 6.1. However, we feel that any welfare analysis of
the eﬀects of using diﬀerent types of financial claims is incomplete if it does
not take into account the fact that if deprived of one potential instrument for
solving the Coase problem, investors may use other, more costly means to do
so. In the following subsection, we briefly mention one alternative solution to
the over-funding problem.
5.2 Lack of Monitoring by Investors
Let us assume that Firm 2’s project may be of two types. With probability α
the project is “good”, in which case funding Firm 2 yields V2 to the investor.
With probability (1 − α) the project is “bad”, and it yields to the investor
V2 < 0. Assume that in the process of funding firm 1, the investor may observe
a signal about Firm 2’s profitability, i.e. he may find out whether Firm 2 is
good or bad. Now suppose we make the additional assumption that:
αV2 + (1− α)V2 < 0
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Then on average the investor makes negative profits with the second firm,
so if he did not receive any signal about the second firm, then he would not
want to fund it. The Coase problem arises only if the investor receives a
good signal about the second firm. Therefore an obvious way for the investor
to solve his Coase problem is to avoid learning the value of the signal. If
Firm 1 knows that the investor simply does not have the infra-structure or
expertise to interpret the signal, for example, then he knows he is safe from
investor expropriation. Thus the firm and the investor can benefit from the
investor failing to set up such means of monitoring, since it enables them to
write a more high-powered (debt-like) contract for the firm, inducing more
eﬀort. We interpret this variation of the model as one of commercial bank
lending. Venture capitalists (and universal banks) monitor the firms in which
they invest very closely, whereas in the UK and US, commercial banks do
notoriously little monitoring. This is a simple demonstration of the fact that
ill-informed investors will generally face fewer over-funding problems, and that
manipulation of the information available to the investor provides a second
means of solving the Coase problem. Of course, in this simple model lack of
monitoring is costless for the investor, whereas it will generally be associated
with adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Then investors must trade-
oﬀ the costs of deliberately inducing such problems with their benefits (in the
form of reduced temptation to fund Firm 2). As we saw above, solving the
Coase problem through the design of financial claims is also costly in terms
of managerial eﬀort, so in general there will be a further trade-oﬀ to be made
between the two types of solution. In addition, there is also a well-known
feedback mechanism between the type of claim held and the incentive of the
investor to engage in monitoring (see e.g. Holmström and Tirole 1993). We
hope to investigate some of these issues in more detail in future work.
5.3 Imperfect Capital Markets and Industrial Concen-
tration
So far in this paper we have assumed that there is one investor who is the
unique source of funds for the industry. In this case, if the investor has ap-
propriate financial incentives to deny funding to Firm 2, the latter will not be
able to enter the industry and compete. To what extent is our analysis robust
to the introduction of competition in the credit market?
We address this issue at greater length elsewhere (Cestone-White 2000),
where we show that the main insights from the monopoly case continue to
hold as long as competition in the credit market is imperfect. The new feature
is that, when the first investor can be bypassed, some competitors may enter
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the product market in equilibrium.16 The optimal anti-competitive contract
commits the investor to fund only the entrants that the second investor would
also fund. As in the present paper, this commitment can only be achieved by
taking a riskier claim in the incumbent firm.
These points can easily be understood with the aid of the following simple
example.17 First notice that if Firm 2 could turn to a perfectly competing
source of funds, it would always enter the market; therefore, the first investor
would never bother to take (costly) equity in Firm 1, as this would not prevent
competition in the product market. Therefore suppose that the second investor
competes imperfectly with the first investor, because he has a higher cost of
funds: r2 > r1 = 1. Once Firm 1 has been funded by Investor 1, the second
investor will fund Firm 2 if and only if V2− (r2− r1)I2 ≥ 0. Then two possible
cases may arise. If 0 < V2 < (r2−r1)I2 there is no competition to fund Firm 2,
and the first investor can prevent competition in the product market by simply
committing himself not to fund Firm 2. In this first case the Coase problem is
an issue and anti-competitive equity financing arises as in Proposition 3 above.
If instead V2 ≥ (r2− r1)I2, then Firm 2 can always turn to the second investor
if denied funding by the first investor. Anticipating this, the first investor will
itself fund Firm 2 and take a debt claim in Firm 1.
The above example, though incomplete, illustrates two important points.
First, when the credit market is imperfectly competitive, anti-competitive goals
have the same qualitative impact on financial contracts as in the monopoly
case: investors take high-powered claims when they aim to deter entry (i.e.
when V2 is low enough for this to be feasible). Second, more competition in
the credit market spurs more intense competition in the product market (as
r2 becomes smaller, it is more likely that Firm 2 is funded in equilibrium).
This is because when competition in the credit market becomes more intense,
the eﬃcient investor has less leeway in restraining entry in the downstream
industry.18
16For an analysis of bypass in a foreclosure setting, see Rey and Tirole (2000).
17The following example is a simplification of our extended model. In the latter we assume
a continuum of potential entrants with diﬀerent values V2. Only those entrants with higher
values can aﬀord to approach a less eﬃcient investor, and thus are not subject to financial
entry deterrence.
18The question of how increased credit market competition should aﬀect the design of
financial contracts is more complex. Two conflicting eﬀects are at work. On the one hand,
when the credit market becomes more competitive (r2 becomes smaller relative to r1), the
Coase problem arises ‘less frequently’, making the investor’s claim more low-powered or
debt-like. On the other hand, in the presence of competition, the reservation wages of the
firms become endogenous. A more eﬃcient competing investor will also oﬀer a better deal
to Firm 1, which has then a higher reservation utility W1. This second eﬀect means that the
first entrepreneur gets more rent and results in an increased payment for the entrepreneur
in the low state. As pointed out in section 4, a larger entrepreneurial stake then feeds back
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This point is intuitively clear, and is confirmed by historical evidence on
the joint evolution of capital market institutions and industry structure. Davis
(1966) provides several case studies of emerging industries in 19th century
U.S. and U.K to argue that in the U.S. “some firms were more successful
than others in their search for ‘informal finance’, and the successful firms grew
at the expense of their less fortunate competitors. As a result, industrial
concentration increased in the aﬀected industries.” Conversely, in England,
“because the capital markets were better”, industries “did not become unduly
concentrated”. It is surprising therefore, that the idea has not received more
attention in the literature. In fact, previous theoretical work assessing the
impact of credit market competition has instead taken a partial equilibrium
approach, abstracting from any interaction with other markets.19 This may
have led to policy prescriptions biased in favor of credit market concentration.
Our paper is among the first to show that countries with poorly competitive
financial markets may risk the emergence of industrial concentration. In light
of this new theory, we argue that the anti-trust monitoring of financial and
product markets should be better coordinated.
6 Two Applications
6.1 Banking Regulation
In some countries, and at some times in the past, the banking industry has not
been perfectly competitive. These settings provide an application for our the-
ory. For example, De Long (1990) argues persuasively that there were severe
barriers to entry (mainly in the form of reputational capital) in the investment
banking industry in the US in the early twentieth century. He argues that
although the investment bankers performed a useful monitoring and certifi-
cation role, ”some share of the increase in value almost surely arose because
investment banker[s]...aided the formation of oligopoly.” Later he remarks
that “Often ‘Morganization’ meant the creation of value for shareholders by
the extraction of monopoly rents from consumers”. Our theory explains how
this was possible, and also why the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) (which prohibits
equity-holding by commercial banks) put an end to so-called financial capital-
into a more serious commitment problem for the investor, implying a more high-powered
claim if the Coase problem is to be solved.
19See for instance Petersen and Rajan (1995) or Matutes and Vives (1996). A notable
exception is Gonzalez-Maestre and Granero (1999) who allow industry and credit-market
structure to be determined endogenously and simultaneously as firms need bank loans to
enter the market. However, in that model, the terms of the bank-firm repayments are made
contingent on the number of competitors that are funded to enter the market, so the Coase
problem does not arise.
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ism in the United States (Segliman 1982). The extension of monopoly power by
banks into industry requires the double coincidence of imperfect competition
in the banking industry and bank equity-holding.20
A major policy debate is now in course as to whether this restrictive legis-
lation should be relaxed. In his overview of the costs and benefits of such a re-
form, Saunders (1994, pp.239-40) expresses concern that, ”A bank may restrict
the supply of credit to the competitors of its commercial firm aﬃliate...while
showing preferential credit treatment towards its aﬃliated firm... This issue
is important given the widely held public policy view that banks are ’special’
in their provision of loans or credit finance to corporations.” The Economist
(Feb 1st 1997) also asks whether pressure to reform the Glass-Steagall Act
”might not ...recreate the cartels of [J.P.] Morgan’s day?” Our model suggests
that these fears would indeed be rationally grounded, if US financial markets
were today as uncompetitive as 70 years ago.21 But given the competitiveness
of sources for funding in the US, a relaxation of the rules will probably have
little impact.
In countries where funding opportunities are more scarce, however, equity
holding by banks may give more cause for concern. For example, entrant firms
in Eastern Europe face severe funding shortages because there is little com-
petition in the banking industry, and little opportunity for outside funding
(Pissarides 1998). Moreover, existing banks tend to be biased towards fund-
ing only incumbent firms (Gordon 1994, p59, Frydman et al 1993). In these
circumstances it might be advisable for these countries to avoid bank equity
holding, rather than encouraging bank debt-equity swaps in the old state in-
dustries, as has sometimes been the case (for a description of events in Poland,
Hungary and Slovenia, see for example van Wijnbergen 1998).
This analysis assumes of course that competition is beneficial (see section
5.1 above). However, there may be instances where it is desirable to hold
oﬀ competition in order to stimulate growth. The situation in Eastern Eu-
rope probably does not correspond to such an instance, since it is the new
entrant firms - currently starved of funding - which are most likely to generate
new growth, rather than the larger former state-owned incumbent enterprises
(Pissarides 1998). But economists such as Schumpeter and Gershenkron have
20For an alternative view of the impact of bank equity-holding, see Arping (1999). In
the context of a perfectly competitive financial market he shows that if entrant firms face a
soft budget constraint, limited ownership of established firms by banks can make it easier
for young firms to obtain debt financing. As in our model, he shows that equity-holding
makes banks act toughly towards entrants. But when the latter cannot otherwise commit
to repay, bank toughness improves their ex post incentives, and thus their ex ante prospects
of finance.
21De Long (1990) raises the interesting possibility that financial capitalism and lack of
concentration in investment banking may be intimately linked, since it is diﬃcult for banks
with small market shares to maintain reputations.
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argued that such a trade-oﬀ was indeed at the centre of the industrial revolu-
tion in Germany and elsewhere. A concise description of the role of large equity
holding banks in Belgian, German and Italian industrialization can be found
in Da Rin and Hellman (1998). It is clear that by holding equity, these banks
(in contrast to the debt-holding British banks of the time, for example), had a
very active interest in the profitability of the firms they funded. They limited
product-market competition, but the monopoly profits made thus available
were ploughed back into the business to produce very fast expansion. But
as growth has slowed down in Germany in the last three decades, there has
been more concern about the large stakes controlled by the banking system,
and the banks have been the subject of several competitive investigations.22 A
more recent concern is that the German economy has not developed the small
dynamic firms in information and bio-technology that have developed in the
US and UK; to the extent that these industries exist in Germany, it is only
as divisions of incumbent firms. Thus one might well worry that the universal
banking system is beginning to stifle growth.
6.2 Convertible debt and the Venture Capitalist’s Coase
problem
6.2.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, the Coase problem may be particularly acute in emerging
industries. In the US, such new industries are often financed by venture capital.
Recent evidence (Gompers and Lerner 2000) suggests that, at least at times
when the supply of funds to venture capital is tight, venture capitalists do have
a degree of market power in financing entrepreneurs.23 This is not surprising
since the number of venture capitalists that an entrepreneur might approach for
funding is often fairly limited: he must choose one which is locally-based and
has specialized knowledge of the industry in which he will operate. The fact
that venture capitalists invariably club together to form syndicates in financing
firms further increases their monopoly power. Indeed, reading descriptions of
the bargaining process between venture capitalist and entrepreneur, one has
the impression that a substantial amount of bargaining power lies with the
22Note that the current German situation diﬀers somewhat from our model in that the
proxy voting system allows the banks to control a much larger fraction of shares than they
actually own.
23Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that the price which venture capitalists pay en-
trepreneurs for shares in their firms rises when the supply of venture capital increases,
and that this is not due to changes in firm characteristics, but rather to “money chasing
deals” and venture capitalists competing to fund projects. The converse of this, of course, is
that at times when the supply of funds is tight, then competition to fund projects is limited,
and venture capitalists can exploit monopoly power in bargaining with entrepreneurs.
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former. The entrepreneur’s ”outside option” lies not in competing oﬀers from
other venture capitalists (who, if interested, will very likely join the same
syndicate once the deal is struck), but in finding other sources of funds (see
e.g. Silver 1984, p.87).
A second feature of the venture capital environment makes them worthy
of separate consideration. The venture capitalist is typically involved in close
monitoring of the entrepreneur. As the relationship continues, the venture
capitalist has access to marketing studies, the results of product testing and
other short term performance measures, and so learns more about how to
avoid pitfalls and problems in the industry. It is almost inevitable that through
financing an innovating firm, the venture capitalist learns something about the
likely profitability of the whole industry. He is then in a much better position
to fund potential entrants, and is naturally tempted to make further use of his
knowledge and exploit his comparative advantage in choosing and monitoring
projects in this industry by funding a competing firm. Indeed, other venture
capital partnerships will often try to persuade him to do so by oﬀering very
attractive deals to join their syndicate in order that they can benefit from his
expertise.
Therefore, it is not very surprising that venture capitalists do sometimes
succumb to the temptation to fund competing firms.24 For example, amongst
the syndicate funding Osborne Computer Corporation were Sevin, Rosen Part-
ners, and First Century Partnership. Sevin, Rosen Partners was the lead in-
vestor in Compaq Computer Corporation, a competitor to Osborne. First
Century Partnership was an investor in Gavilan Computer Corporation, a
portable computer manufacturer (Silver, 1984 p.58). In a particularly severe
case of over-funding (probably from a social as well as an industry point of
view), Sahlman and Stevenson (1985) document “the six year long parade of
venture capital investors into an emerging segment of the computer data stor-
age industry. In all, 43 start-ups were funded in an industry segment that
could be expected in the long run to support perhaps four.”
Given the practical importance of the Coase problem for the venture capital
industry, one might expect from the simple model of section 4 that they would
hold common equity claims in their investments. This is indeed the case for late
stage investments. For early stage investments, venture capitalists prefer to use
convertible debt or convertible preferred stock (Sahlman 1990, Gompers 1996).
In addition, the conversion often occurs automatically upon the attainment of
24As mentioned in section 5.3 above, it is simple to extend the model of section 4 to
allow for cases where over-funding occurs probabilistically in equilibrium. If the investor
does not know the value of V2 in advance of contracting with Firm 1, he trades oﬀ the
certain reduction in Firm 1’s incentives, against the chance that Firm 2 will be suﬃciently
profitable that he will be tempted to fund Firm 2 ex post. The optimal probability of entry
will generally be strictly positive (see Cestone-White 2000 for more detail).
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certain profits, sales, or performance milestones. We now extend our previous
model to explain these facts. In this we bring a new insight to the study of
venture capital finance. Previous models have focussed on the concave-convex
shape of the return stream giving the entrepreneur desirable incentives not to
engage in excessive risk taking (Gompers 1996, Biais and Casamatta 1999) or
signal manipulation (Cornelli and Yosha 1997).25 But in these models, the
conversion of debt into equity is done to improve entrepreneurial incentives. It
is in the venture capitalist’s interest to convert when the good signal arrives
(because he wants to constrain the entrepreneur), so it is not at all obvious why
he should write an agreement constraining himself to do something which he
will anyway find optimal ex post. Automatic conversion does not add anything
to standard voluntary conversion agreements. Our model is the first which
explains automatic conversion. As will become clear in the following analysis,
the time-inconsistency feature of the Coase problem means that conversion
must be agreed ex ante, because it may no longer be optimal ex post. Our
explanation draws upon the feature of venture capital funding outlined above
- that through early stage investments, the venture capitalist learns about the
prospects for profitable entry into the industry.26
6.2.2 A Model of Convertible Debt
We use the same basic model as in section 4 above, but assume in addition
that further information about Firm 2’s profitability is revealed to all parties
after the first stage of Firm 1’s financing.27 We show that even if there is no
new information about firm 1 itself, it is optimal to make Firm 1’s contract
contingent on this information because of the need to solve the Coase problem.
Our assumptions are specified in what follows.
Project
Firm 1’s payoﬀ structure is the same as in the basic model. Firm 2’s project
may be of two types. With probability α the project is ”good”, in which case
it yields the payoﬀs RH and RL with the probabilities specified in the basic
25We focus here only on those papers which study the cash flow allocation created by
convertible debt contracts, since this is also our approach. A second set of papers stresses
the allocation of control rights induced by convertible securities. An earlier literature looks
at how one might design claims to motivate venture capitalists (in particular, to ensure
adequate monitoring). But this early literature does not explain the use of convertible debt.
26It is arguable that late stage investments do not involve much learning about industry
prospects, because (a) usually by this late stage, the success of the industry is already
assured and (b) late stage investments are usually undertaken by venture capitalists without
specialized knowledge of the industry, with little monitoring. Thus the model of section 4
fits this situation without modification.
27More generally, one might suppose that new information about Firm 1 ’s profitability is
also revealed as Firm 1’s business plan proceeds, but we ignore this additional complication.
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model. With probability (1 − α) the project is ”bad”: it yields a zero payoﬀ
with some positive probability x. The stochastic structure of the payoﬀs for a
bad project is summarized in the following matrix:
RH e2 −∆− x
RL 1− e2 +∆
0 x
where e2 is eﬀort exerted by the second entrepreneur.
At the contracting stage neither the venture capitalist nor firm 1 knows
firm 2’s type.
Timing
The timing of events is as follows:
t=1 (Contracting stage) The investor oﬀers a contract to Firm 1. Firm 1
accepts or rejects. At this stage neither the firm nor the investor knows Firm
2 ’s type.
t=2 (Start-up stage) In the process of starting Firm 1’s project, the en-
trepreneur and the venture capitalist observe a signal about Firm 2’s prof-
itability: as a result, they find out whether Firm 2 is good or bad. The signal
is verifiable.28 At the end of this stage both parties have an exit option: they
can abandon the project if their continuation payoﬀ is negative.
t=3 (Production stage) Firm 1 picks a level of eﬀort e ∈ [∆, 1]. This
decision is not observed by the investor.
t=4 The investor decides whether to fund Firm 2 or not; if he decides to
do so, he oﬀers a contract to Firm 2, which then accepts or rejects. Firm 2
observes whether Firm 1 has been funded and knows its type when considering
the investor’s oﬀer. If Firm 2 accepts the contract, it then picks an eﬀort level
e2 ∈ [∆+ x, 1].
t=5 Payoﬀs are realized according to each manager’s level of eﬀort and
whether the investor has funded one or both firms. The first entrepreneur and
the venture capitalist share returns according to the contract signed at t=1.
If Firm 2 was funded at t=4, then the second entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist share Firm 2’s profits according to the contract they signed then.
Firm 2’s credit-worthiness
We define:
V2 =Maxe2,RLb2,RHb2 (e2 −∆− x)(R −RHb2) + (1− e2 +∆)(RL −RLb2)− I2
s.t. : (e2 −∆− x)RHb2 + (1− e2 +∆)RLb2 −Ψ(e2) ≥ 0
RHb2 −RLb2 = Ψ0(e2)
28If the signal is not verifiable, the analysis would proceed in much the same way. There
would be an additional incentive compatibility constraint on the investor’s program (given
below) to ensure that the investor indeed converts his debt when he would otherwise face
the Coase problem.
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RLb2 ≥ 0, RHb2 ≥ 0
V2 is the net present value of Firm 2’s project, net of agency costs, when
Firm 2 is “bad”. Let us assume:
V2 < 0
A bad-type Firm 2 is never worth funding. This means that the Coase
problem will not arise if, in the process of funding Firm 1, the venture capitalist
receives a bad signal about Firm 2.
Funding a good-type Firm 2 yieldsV2 to the venture capitalist, whereV2 is
as defined in section 3.2. We assume that condition (1) holds, i.e. the venture
capitalist is tempted to fund firm 1’s rival whenever he receives good signals
about its profitability (and holds the ”second best claim” in Firm 1).
Contracts
The financial contract with Firm 1 can be made contingent on the signal
observed at stage 2. Therefore, a contract specifies the firm’s payoﬀs in each
possible state of nature:
n
RLb , R
H
b , R
L
b , R
H
b
o
. RLb (R
H
b ) is the entrepreneur’s
reward in case of failure (success), contingent on a bad signal being observed at
stage 2, and R
L
b ( R
H
b ) is the entrepreneur’s reward in case of failure (success)
contingent on a good signal being observed at stage 2.
The optimal contract to be oﬀered to Firm 1 will solve the following pro-
gram:
Max
RHb ,R
L
b ,R
H
b ,R
L
b ,e,e
α
h
e(RH −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb )
i
+
(1− α)
h
e(RH −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb )
i
− I1
(IR ) e RHb + (1− e) RLb −Ψ(e) ≥W
(IR) eRHb + (1− e)RLb −Ψ(e) ≥W
(IC) RHb −RLb = Ψ0(e), RHb −RLb = Ψ0(e)
(ICI) e(R
H −RHb ) + (1− e)(RL −RLb ) ≥
(e−∆)(RH −RHb ) + (1− e+∆)(RL −RLb ) +V2
(LL) RLb ≥ 0, RHb ≥ 0, RLb ≥ 0, RHb ≥ 0
We will refer to this as the venture capitalist’s program. According to
whether a good or a bad signal is observed at stage 2, eﬀort e¯ or e is im-
plemented. As the entrepreneur may abandon the project after the signal is
observed, the contract must satisfy his ex-post participation constraints IR
and IR: not only must the entrepreneur be willing to accept the contract at
date 1, but he also must continue the project after receiving a bad or a good
signal about his potential rival. (IC), the firm’s incentive constraint, gives the
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first order conditions for the entrepreneurial eﬀort choice after a bad and a
good signal. The investor’s incentive compatibility constraint just states that,
after receiving a good signal on Firm 2, the venture capitalist must prefer not
to fund Firm 2. Since if a bad signal is observed, the venture capitalist will
never want to fund firm 2, the contract does not need to prevent any over-
funding behavior in this case. The last constraint ensures limited liability for
the entrepreneur.
The solution to this program is stated in the following:
Lemma 4 The optimal financial contract for the venture capitalist will be con-
tingent on the signal received at date 2.
If a bad signal is observed at date 2, then the entrepreneur is paid RLb = 0
in case of failure and RHb = Ψ
0(eM) in case of success, where eM is the second
best eﬀort defined in Lemma 1. Entrepreneurial eﬀort is e = eM .
If a good signal is observed at date 2, then the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs are
the same as in Lemma 2:
(i) for W ≤ Wˆ , the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs are RLb = 0 and RHb = Ψ0(eCP )
(ii) for W > Wˆ, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs are R
L
b = b and R
H
b = b +
Ψ0(eCP )
Entrepreneurial eﬀort is e = eCP , i.e. the third best level of eﬀort.
Proof. This result is immediate since the venture capitalist’s program can
be split in two separate programs: the optimal levels of RLb , R
H
b , e are found
by solving a program which is formally identical to the second best optimum,
whereas the optimal levels of R
L
b , R
H
b and e are the solution to a program which
is identical to the third best optimum.
We provide an interpretation for the optimal financial contract that is con-
sistent with the evidence on the modes of financing observed in venture capital
deals.
Proposition 5 There exists a convertible debt contract, {D0, D1, s} , that im-
plements the optimal financial contract of Lemma 4. The venture capitalist
initially takes debt D0 = RH −Ψ0(eM) in Firm 1. If and only if a good signal
occurs then part of the debt is automatically converted into an equity stake
s = 1 − Ψ0(eCP )
RH−RL , so that the venture capitalist is left with a debt position D1.
The post-conversion debt position is decreasing in W:
(i) if W ≤ Wˆ , then D1 = RL
(ii) if W > Wˆ , then D1 = RL − b(RH−RL)Ψ0(eCP ) where b =W − Wˆ .
Proof. If a bad signal occurs, then the venture capitalist is left with a debt
claim D0 = RH − Ψ0(eM). But, according to Lemma 1, this financial claim
implements the contractRLb = 0 , R
H
b = Ψ
0(eM). If a good signal occurs, part of
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the debt is converted into equity, so that the venture capitalist’s claim becomes
a combination of debt D1 and an equity stake s in Firm 1. From Proposition
3 it follows that this is equivalent to paying the entrepreneur R
L
b in case of
failure and R
H
b in case of success, with R
L
b and R
H
b defined as in Lemma 4.
In the basic model of section 4, we showed that holding debt plus an equity
stake in Firm 1 makes the investor less eager to fund Firm 2. Using a standard
debt contract would have instead provided maximal incentives to Firm 1’s
entrepreneur, but left room for the venture capitalist’s Coase problem. So,
the Coase problem had to be solved through equity at the cost of a lower
managerial eﬀort.
When there is a verifiable signal about the likelihood of the Coase problem
arising, debt converting automatically on realization of the signal does better
than a simple equity claim or straight debt in dealing with this trade-oﬀ.29 It
gives the venture capitalist an equity claim and thus prevents him from funding
Firm 2 only when this temptation arises, that is, only after a good signal about
Firm 2’s profitability is observed. After a bad signal is observed, the Coase
problem is not an issue. Therefore, in that contingency it is preferable for the
venture capitalist to hold a debt claim to maximize entrepreneurial incentives.
Notice, however, that conditional on having observed the good signal, the
venture capitalist may not want to convert his debt into equity. It may be more
profitable for him to keep his relatively safe debt in the first firm, and instead
make a profit from funding the second firm. Of course, ex ante, the venture
capitalist would like to commit himself to solving the Coase problem when it
arises in order to extract better terms from Firm 1; but ex post, having signed
the contract with Firm 1, this consideration is no longer important. This is
why it must be agreed in advance that conversion will take place automatically
upon observation of the signal. If conversion is left to the venture capitalist’s
discretion ex post, this entails an extra incentive compatibility constraint for
the venture capitalist, which may not be met, so that voluntarily convertible
debt will not solve the overfunding problem. In this result, we make a signif-
icant advance over the previous literature, which has seen convertible debt as
designed to motivate entrepreneurs, and has thus been unable to diﬀerentiate
between automatic and voluntary conversion agreements.
29In this we diﬀer from Gompers (1996) and Biais-Casamatta (1999). Because these
papers take an essentially static approach, convertible debt is equivalent to debt plus equity,
and it is not clear why the former should be preferred to the latter.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have drawn attention to a new channel through which entry
deterrence can operate. Previous work has focused firstly on the product mar-
ket moves a firm can make to discourage entry (Spence (1977) and Dixit(1980))
and then on how financial commitments can be used to induce such product
market behavior (Brander and Lewis (1986)). We show that when capital mar-
kets are imperfectly competitive, there is an alternative way to prevent entry
which has nothing to do with altering product market behavior. Instead it
relies on altering investors’ incentives in order that they are unwilling to fund
entrant firms.
To simplify matters, we have considered the case of a monopoly investor.
We showed that even in the monopoly case, when financial entry deterrence
should in principle be easiest, ensuring that the investor does not fund compet-
ing firms is not a trivial matter. Although the investor would like to commit
ex ante to avoiding competition (since this reduces industry surplus), ex post
he will face a commitment problem in doing so. Once the contract with the
first firm is signed, the investor can appropriate some of that firm’s returns by
funding a second entrant to the industry. Of course, anticipating this, the first
firm will not agree to the same terms, so the investor must find a way to com-
mit to deterring entry. The solution is to make sure that the investor’s stake
in the first firm is suﬃciently sensitive to the first firm’s ex post performance
that he no longer gains from introducing competition. In other words, to deter
entry, the first firm must be funded by equity, even at the cost of reducing
the entrepreneur’s incentives to exert eﬀort. The whole problem of financial
entry deterrence is analogous to that of foreclosure in the vertical integration
literature; the investor’s commitment problem is a variant of the well known
Coase problem of oversupply of inputs, with the input in this case being money.
Equity finance plays the role of vertical integration in our context.
Applying the logic of foreclosure to financial markets provides several new
insights. Firstly, previous generalities are shown to no longer hold true. In
particular, it is equity that is the entry deterring claim, whereas in previous
analyses relying on product market incentives, it was always debt finance that
constituted aggressive behavior.30
30This was true no matter whether competition was in strategic substitutes (Brander and
Lewis, 1986), or complements (Showalter 1995), or potential collusion (Maskimovic 1988).
The exception is Poitevin (1989), where an equity-financed incumbent has an advantage over
the debt-financed entrant in predatory price wars. But there the focus is on the design of
the entrant’s claim, which (because of asymmetric information) gives him “short pockets”;
the incumbent deters entry by threatening a price war. Here instead, we emphasize how the
design of the incumbent’s claim deters entry by making it diﬃcult for entrant to get finance.
The design of the entrant’s claim and the behavior of the incumbent in the event of entry -
central to the Poitevin result - are largely irrelevant here.
28
Secondly, we showed that lack of competition in financial markets can trans-
late into lack of competition in product markets. It is surprising that, such an
important implication has previously received so little attention in the litera-
ture. The result confirms economists’ previous intuition as to the centrality of
the eﬃcient operation of financial markets to a well-functioning economy.
Thirdly our model suggests that this vertical extension of market power is
hampered by a Coasian commitment problem if investors cannot hold equity
finance, yielding strong implications for the regulation of banks in imperfectly
competitive financial markets. Equity-holding by banks in such markets should
be limited - except where considerations of competition are to be subordinated
to goals of faster growth which may come from monopoly power.
Fourthly, we extend the basic model to allow us to better understand ven-
ture capital finance. We present evidence that venture capitalists have market
power in the provision of finance to entrepreneurs. We argue that they are
particularly vulnerable to the Coase problem, since in the process of funding
incumbent firms they learn about the prospects for new entrants to the indus-
try. This makes them more tempted to fund new entrants than they otherwise
would be (since they avoid much downside risk). We use these two features of
venture capital finance to explain why venture capital claims are frequently in
the form of automatically convertible debt. The reasons for automatic conver-
sion were previously something of a puzzle. In existing models, conversion was
always optimal for the venture capitalist on attainment of the signal, so it was
not obvious why he should need to commit himself to this strategy. The time-
inconsistency inherent in the Coase problem provides a clue to the reason. Ex
ante, the venture capitalist would like to commit not to fund future entrants
in order to give suﬃcient reward to the first firm it funds. But ex post, once
the venture capitalist has learned that funding new entrants will be profitable,
he may prefer to retain debt in the first firm and fund entrant firms. Therefore
he needs to commit himself to instead holding equity when the good signal
arrives, and thus having little incentive to introduce competition. When the
signal is bad, however, he retains debt in order to maximize entrepreneurial
incentives. Thus the optimal claim is debt converting to equity automatically
on attainment of signals of high profitability.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
Substitute RHb = R
L
b +Ψ
0(e) throughout and write the first order conditions
for e and RLb :
(1) ∂L
∂e
= RH −RL −Ψ0(e)− eΨ00(e) + λ [eΨ00(e)] = 0
(2) ∂L
∂RL
b
= −1+ λ ≤ 0 and (−1+ λ)RLb = 0
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the (IR) constraint.
(i) If (IR) does not bind at the optimum, then λ = 0 and eM is determined
by RH − RL = Ψ0(eM) + eMΨ00(eM). From Ψ00(e)>0 and the definition of the
first best eﬀort e∗, it follows e < e∗. As (IR) is slack, λ = 0 and thus RLb = 0.
For this to be the case, the level of eﬀort must satisfy: eMΨ0(eM)−Ψ(eM) ≥W ,
i.e. it must be W ≤W1.
(ii) Suppose instead that W > W1. Then the contract in (i) cannot be the
solution to the program, as it fails to satisfy (IR). Then, either RHb or R
L
b must
be raised. As eM < e∗, it is optimal to raise only the entrepreneur’s payment
in the high state, so as to raise his eﬀort. Therefore, RHb = Ψ
0(eM(W )), where
eM(W ) satisfies (IR) as an equality: eM(W )Ψ0(eM(W ))−Ψ(eM(W )) = W.
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